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BURNING THE VILLAGE TO ROAST THE PIG:
CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPT TO REGULATE
"INDECENCY" ON THE INTERNET REJECTED
IN ACLU V. RENO
I. INTRODUCTION
This Congress is poised on the brink of not merely
infringing but willfully and deliberately violating the
basic intent of the First Amendment, which is that
public, noncommercial speech about our lives and our
world can and will not be screened, examined and
even prosecuted. The greatness of the American
system is founded on the belief, so severely being
tested yet again, that any speech which does not
cause direct, provable harm (such as direct incite-
ment to riot) cannot be restricted. Who among us
thinks they know so well what is best for our people,
our nation, our world that they would restrict the
ability of others to speak and be heard? The zealots
among us will. They are calling us, reluctant as we
are, to debate and decide whether our ability to
communicate with each other is not a fundamental
right of our existence.'
Can Congress regulate communications over the Internet that
might be deemed "indecent" or "patently offensive" for minors? On
June 11, 1996 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania answered this question with a resounding
no.2 Holding that certain provisions of the 1996 Communications
Decency Act ("CDA") are unconstitutional, the court enjoined
"Attorney General Janet Reno, and all acting under her direction
' Richard N. Coglianese, Comment, Sex, Bytes and Community Entrapment: The Need
for a New Obscenity Standard for the Twenty-First Century, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 385, 412
n.193 (1995) (citing Robert Rossney, Congress Wants to Restrict Free Speech on the Net, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 14, 1995, at D3 (noting one Internet user's opinion of the then-proposed
Communications Decency Act)).2 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
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and control ... from enforcing, prosecuting, investigating or
reviewing any matter premised upon..." the challenged provisions
of the CDA.3
Besides the obvious importance of this decision for holding that
key provisions of the CDA are unconstitutional, other aspects of
this opinion are significant. The court's detailed analysis of the
creation and nature of the Internet, which resulted from extensive
evidentiary hearings, will likely be frequently cited to as the
authoritative definition of this new and evolving method of
communication.4 This fact finding was instrumental in developing
the court's recognition of the Internet as a unique medium worthy
of the highest level of First Amendment protection.
The Government appealed to the Supreme Court for review of the
ACLU v. Reno decision, and the Court has granted certiorari.5
When this case is reviewed by the Court, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania's decision should be affirmed because the CDA is an
unconstitutional infringement on free speech. While the Govern-
ment clearly has an interest in protecting children from some on-
line material, the CDA is unable to pass constitutional muster
because it is overly broad, vague and not narrowly tailored.
Further, the negative impacts from restricting indecent speech are
too severe to ever be outweighed by countervailing Government
interests under a constitutional balancing analysis.
'Id. at 883. A separate challenge to the CDA, filed in the Southern District of New York,
also resulted in a preliminary injunction on July 29, 1996. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp.
916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that § 223(d) is an overbroad ban on constitutionally protected
communications among adults but declining to hold that the provision is void for vagueness).
' Several courts have already cited ACLU v. Reno. See Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry
Publishing, 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1034-35 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing ACLU v. Reno as giving
a thorough analysis of the Internet); Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 618 (C.D.
Cal. 1996) (citing ACLU v. Reno); Malarkey-Taylor Assocs. v. Cellular Telecommunications
Indus. Assoc., 929 F. Supp. 473, 476 n.1 (D.D.C. 1996) (citingACLUv. Reno's findings of fact
concerning the nature of the Internet).
" Direct appeal to the Supreme Court is available through § 561(b) of the CDA, which
provides in part: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an interlocutory or final
judgment, decree, or order of the court ... holding this title or an amendment made by this
title, or any provision thereof, unconstitutional shall be reviewable as a matter of right by
direct appeal to the Supreme Court." Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §
561(b), 110 Stat. 133, 143 (1996).
438 [Vol. 4:437
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II. ACLU v. RENO
A. FACTUAL HISTORY
The Communications Decency Act 6 was signed into law by
President Clinton on February 8, 1996. On the day the CDA was
signed, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and the
American Library Association, joined by numerous individuals and
organizations associated with the computer and communications
industries, filed suit against Attorney General Janet Reno and the
United States Department of Justice (collectively "the Govern-
ment") to enjoin enforcement of certain provisions of the CDA.7
Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter of the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia granted the ACLU a limited temporary restraining order on
February 15, 1996.8
On the day the temporary restraining order was issued, Chief
Judge Dolores K. Sloviter of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit convened a three-judge panel pursuant to section
561(a) of the CDA9 at the request of the parties and the district
court.1° The panel consisted of Judge Sloviter, Judge Buckwalter
and Judge Stewart Dalzell of the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia.1
The parties subsequently entered into a stipulation with the
court that the Government would not initiate any prosecutions for
alleged violations of the challenged provisions until the ACLU's
motion for preliminary injunction was decided upon. 2 This
6 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West Supp. 1996). The CDA will eventually be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 223(a) through (h). For purposes of this Recent Development, the CDA provisions will be
referred to as they will ultimately be codified in the United States Code.
7 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
a Id.
9 Section 561(a) provides in part: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any civil
action challenging the constitutionality, on its face, of this title or any amendment made by
this title, or any provision thereof, shall be heard by a district court of 3 judges convened
pursuant to the provisions of section 2284 of title 28, United States Code." Communications
Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561(a), 110 Stat. 133, 142 (1996). 28 U.S.C. § 2284
provides in part: "A district court of three judges shall be convened when otherwise required
by Act of Congress. .. ." 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1994).10 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 827.
u Id.
12 Id.
1997] 439
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commitment was qualified to the extent that the Government
retained full authority to investigate or prosecute any violation of
the challenged provisions occurring at any time after the enactment
of these provisions, including the time period to which the parties'
stipulation applied, in the event that the preliminary injunction
was denied.13
Focusing their challenge on 47 U.S.C. section 223(a) (the
"indecency provision")14 and 47 U.S.C. section 223(d) (the "patently
offensive provision"), 5 the ACLU contended that these provisions
infringed upon rights protected by the First Amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The ACLU based
their facial challenges to the disputed provisions of the CDA on the
grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.16 The ACLU made it clear
13 Id.
1' The indecency provision provides in part:
Whoever
(1) in interstate or foreign communications...
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is
obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the commu-
nication is under 18 years of age...; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control
to be used for any [such] activity.., shall be fined.., or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.
47 U.S.CA. § 223(a) (West Supp. 1996).
15 The patently offensive provision provides in part:
Whoever
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific
person or persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a
manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless
of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated
the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such
person's control to be used for [such] an activity.., shall be fined ... or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
47 U.S.CA. § 223(d) (West Supp. 1996).
'6 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 859 n.4 (E.D. Pa.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 554
(1996).
440
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that they did not challenge the CDA to the extent that it covers
obscenity or child pornography, which federal statutes already
proscribed prior to the adoption of the CDA. 7 Rather, the ACLU
based their suit on their belief that the CDA's attempt to regulate
"indecency" reached much further than obscenity or child pornogra-
phy and infringed upon protected constitutional rights. In addition,
the ACLU challenged one other provision of the CDA, but that
provision did not become an issue in this case.'"
Conversely, the Government argued that the CDA passed
constitutional muster because the Government has a compelling
interest in protecting minors from indecent material on the
Internet. 9 Further, the Government maintained that the chal-
lenged provisions were narrowly tailored, and in support of its
argument the Government cited the defenses available in the
CDA's "safe harbor provision" in 47 U.S.C. section 223(e). 20
'7 Id. at 829. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1464-65 (criminalizing obscene material); 18 U.S.C. §§
2251-52 (criminalizing child pornography); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(upholding constitutionality of obscenity laws); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)
(upholding constitutionality of child pornography laws).
' ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 829. The ACLU also challenged a provision of the CDA
criminalizing Internet transmissions communicating information about abortions or
abortifacient drugs and devices. Id. The Department of Justice indicated that such
provisions are unconstitutional and will not be enforced, and that President Clinton and
Attorney General Reno have ensured that no one will be prosecuted under this provision.
Id. at 829 n.7. The ACLU subsequently stated in a post-hearing brief that in view of these
statements they would not seek a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of this
provision. Id. at 829.
19 Id. at 852.
I&o d. at 855. The safe harbor provision provides in part:
(1) No person shall be held to have violated subsection (a) or (d) of this
section solely for providing access or connection to or from a facility,
system, or network not under that person's control, including transmis-
sion, downloading, intermediate storage, access software, or other related
capabilities that are incidental to providing such access or connection
that does not include the creation of the content of the communication
(4) No employer shall be held liable under this section for the actions of
an employee or agent unless the employee's or agent's conduct is within
the scope of his or her employment or agency and the employer (A)
having knowledge of such conduct, authorizes or ratifies such conduct, or
(B) recklessly disregards such conduct.
(5) It is a defense to a prosecution.., that a person-
(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropri-
ate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent
5
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B. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
Granting the requested preliminary injunction, the court held
that the ACLU had established a "reasonable probability of
eventual success" on the merits by demonstrating that 47 U.S.C.
sections 223(a)(1)(B) and (2) are facially unconstitutional to the
extent that they reach indecency and that 47 U.S.C. sections
223(d)(1) and (2) are facially unconstitutional.2 Additionally, the
court concluded that the ACLU had demonstrated that they would
suffer irreparable injury if injunctive relief was not granted, that
no party had any interest in the enforcement of an unconstitutional
law, and that the public interest would therefore be served by
granting the preliminary injunction.22 Each member of the three-
judge panel wrote a separate opinion, and they disagreed on some
key points in their analyses.
1. Judge Sloviter. Holding that the challenged provisions are too
broad and vague and therefore unconstitutional, Judge Sloviter
began her analysis by setting forth the proper standard for issuance
of a preliminary injunction. For a preliminary injunction, a
plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits and that
they will suffer irreparable harm if denied injunctive relief.23
Additionally, the court must decide whether the granting of an
injunction is in the public interest.24  Sloviter found that there
was a threat of irreparable harm and stated that "[slubjecting
speakers to criminal penalties for speech that is constitutionally
protected in itself raises the spect[er] of irreparable harm."'
Further, granting injunctive relief would be in the public interest
access by minors to a communication specified in such subsec-
tions, which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict
minors from such communications, including any method which
is feasible under available technology; or
(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring
use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code,
or adult personal identification number.
47 U.S.C. § 223(e) (West Supp. 1996).
2 1 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (E.D. Pa.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 55.4 (1996).
2 Id.
23 d. at 851.
24 Id.
25Id.
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as the "public interest weighs in favor of having access to a free
flow of constitutionally protected speech."26 The only remaining
requirement, therefore, was that the ACLU establish a likelihood
of success on the merits.
Beginning her analysis of the ACLU's potential for success in the
litigation, Sloviter recognized that the CDA is a content-based
restriction on speech.27  Because of this, she stated that the
statute should be subject to strict scrutiny, and "will only be upheld
if it is justified by a compelling government[al] interest and if it is
narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest."' The Government
was given the burden of establishing that it had a compelling
interest and that the statute was narrowly tailored.29
Attempting to establish a compelling interest, the Government
asserted that the goal of protecting minors from access to indecent
materials on the Internet justified the challenged CDA provi-
sions.3 ° In support of its argument, the Government cited two
Supreme Court decisions and an opinion from the Third Circuit.3"
Sloviter did not find these cases persuasive since they dealt with
pornographic material, while some of the information subject to the
indecency and patently offensive provisions may include literary,
artistic or educational material.32 While Sloviter was not certain
that the Government had established a compelling interest
justifying regulation of indecent speech on the Internet, she did
acknowledge that there is a substantial governmental interest in
shielding minors from some Internet material.33 Declining to
decide whether the Government had demonstrated a compelling
interest, Sloviter instead based her decision on other grounds.
In the next section of her opinion, Sloviter analyzed the reach of
"ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851.
2 Id.
SId. (citing Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
29 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851.
3 Id. at 852.
31 Id. The Government cited New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982), Sable
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989), and Fabulous Associates v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 896 F.2d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 1990), for the proposition
that a state's interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of its minors
is compelling. Id
2 Id.
w Id.
1997] 443
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the challenged provisions. "Whatever the strength of the interest
the government has demonstrated... if the means it has chosen
sweeps more broadly than necessary and thereby chills the
expression of adults, it has overstepped onto rights protected by the
First Amendment."' Referring to the court's findings of fact,
Sloviter noted that it may be impossible for many individuals and
organizations to comply with the mandates of the CDA without
seriously hampering their dissemination of material on the
Internet.3 r Most content providers cannot determine the age and
identity of each individual user who accesses their material.'
Since it is not feasible for content providers to screen for age, they
would have to restrict their dissemination of material to that which
is appropriate for children in order to comply with the CDA.
3 7
Sloviter recognized that the reach of the challenged provisions is
therefore too broad as it would restrict adults from material,
indecent or not, that they are constitutionally entitled to access.
38
Regardless of any compelling reasons Congress had for enacting the
statute, Sloviter decided that the reach of the challenged provisions
swept more broadly than necessary and therefore infringed upon
First Amendment rights. The scope of the CDA is not confined to
obscene material or material that has a prurient appeal.39
Rather, Congress reached too far by attempting to legislate
"indecent" material.4 9
Sloviter next addressed the Government's position that the
challenged provisions are not overly broad because they are
narrowly tailored. The Government relied on the statutory
defenses enumerated in 47 U.S.C. section 223(e)41 for this argu-
ment, but Sloviter was not persuaded for several reasons.42 First,
Sloviter found it difficult to view the statute as narrowly tailored
in light of the criminal sanctions potentially imposed on an Internet
'4 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 854.
35 Id
36 Id.
7 Id.
I8 ld.
' ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855.
40 Id.
1 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
42 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855-56.
444 [Vol. 4:437
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content provider. 43 Further, Sloviter noted that the credit card
and adult verification services referred to as "defenses" in section
223(e)(5)(B) 44 are not "technologically or economically feasible for
most providers.' For similar reasons, Sloviter found that the
"good faith" defense available under section 223(e)(5)(A) 4 failed
to restrict the scope of the statute as no technology currently exists
for providers to restrict or prevent access by minors to indecent
material on the Internet.47 Because of the possibility of criminal
sanctions and the failure of section 223(e) adequately to restrict the
scope of the CDA, Sloviter concluded that the challenged provisions
were not narrowly tailored.
In conjunction with her analysis of whether the CDA is narrowly
tailored, Sloviter addressed the vagueness issue since "the viability
of the defenses is intricately tied to the clarity of the CDA's
scope." 48 Sloviter concluded that the statutory defenses in section
223(e) do not provide sufficient protection from the unconstitutional
reach of the statute because "indecent" and "patently offensive" are
inherently vague terms. 49  "Indecent" and "patently offensive"
material could arguably include award winning plays, films, books,
artwork and information on prison rape or AIDS.5 ° These terms
are especially vague because of the Government's failure to
establish by whose community standards the material is to be
judged.5
Completing her analysis of the issues raised in this case, Sloviter
concluded that the ACLU would likely prevail on the merits of their
4 id.
"See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
'ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 856.
"See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
47 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 856.
4 Id.
9 Id.
60 Id. at 852-53. The Broadway play Angels in America, which broaches such topics as
homosexuality and AIDS, won two Tony awards and a Pulitzer prize, yet it would arguably
fall within the scope of the CDA. Id, at 853. Photographs from National Geographic
magazine and a statue from India of couples copulating are other non-obscene materials that
could be considered indecent. Id. Additionally, material available on the Internet regarding
prison rape and AIDS, which may be critical to imprisoned minors, could possibly be deemed
indecent and banned from the Internet. Id.
51 Id. at 866. While the material presented in Angels in America might be acceptable
according to New York City standards, it might be far less acceptable in the smaller
communities of the United States. Id. at 852-53.
1997] 445
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argument that the CDA's indecency and patently offensive provi-
sions are facially invalid under both the First and Fifth Amend-
ments.52
2. Judge Buckwalter. Judge Buckwalter agreed with Judge
Sloviter that the reach of the challenged provisions is too broad,
that the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" are vague, and
that the CDA is not narrowly tailored since current technology is
inadequate to provide a safe harbor for most speakers on the
Internet."3 While he concluded that the challenged provisions are
unconstitutional, Buckwalter expressly restricted the scope of his
opinion. Stating that it is premature to conclude that other
attempts to regulate protected speech on the Internet would fail a
constitutional challenge, Buckwalter specifically refused to hold
that "any and all statutory regulation of protected speech on the
Internet could not survive constitutional scrutiny."" Buckwalter
thus left the door open to the possibility of future government
regulation that might be able to withstand a constitutional
challenge.
Unlike Sloviter, whose opinion focused on the overbreadth of the
challenged provisions, Buckwalter chose to center his opinion
around the vagueness issue. Buckwalter began his vagueness
analysis by stating: "[i]f the Government... intrude[s] upon the
sacred ground of the First Amendment and tell[s] its citizens that
their exercise of protected speech could land them in jail, the law
... must clearly define the prohibited speech not only for the
potential offender but also for the potential enforcer."55 The
Government's position was that while "indecent" was not expressly
defined in the CDA, it was intended to have the same meaning as
"patently offensive," which was defined in the CDA.s Buckwalter
did not agree that this conclusion was supported by a reading of
the CDA. He stated "[i]f 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' were
intended to have the same meaning, surely section (a) could have
' ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 857.
63 Id. at 858.
4Id. at 859.
Id. at 860.
Id. Congress enacted § 223(a) "without any language confining Indecent' to
descriptions or depictions of 'sexual or excretory activities or organs,' language it included
in the reference to 'patently offensive' in [section] 223(dX1XB)." Id. at 850.
446 [Vol. 4:437
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mirrored section (d)'s language. Indecent in this statute is an
undefined word which, standing alone, offers no guidelines
whatsoever as to its parameters.6 7 Buckwalter went on to state
that even if one conceded that the terms were synonymous, this
would provide no better guidance to a speaker on the Internet
trying to comply with the mandates of the CDA."
Buckwalter conceded that several courts have upheld the use of
the term "indecent" in statutes regulating various media.5" In
these cases, however, the courts have defined "indecent" by
reference to contemporary community standards for that particular
medium.' In the CDA, there was no attempt to set forth what
community standard would be applied to cyberspace.' The
Government tried to justify the lack of a specified community
standard for indecency by claiming that that CDA is intended to
establish a uniform national standard for all communities.62
Buckwalter responded to this by stating that the nation's communi-
ties are too numerous and varied for a definition of "indecency" or
"patently offensive" to be established in a single standard for all
communities. 63 One is therefore ultimately unable to discern the
relevant community standard to follow in order to comply with the
CDA, thus causing individuals to be more cautious than if the
applicable community standard were clearly defined.' Buckwal-
ter concluded that "[tihe chilling effect on the Internet users'
exercise of free speech is obvious." '
Finally, Buckwalter addressed the Government's argument that
pornographic materials would be the target of prosecution under
the CDA rather than works with serious value. 66 Buckwalter did
not share the Government's faith in prosecutors to prosecute only
that material that would be considered indecent or patently
offensive in all communities. He stated, "[tihe hazard of being
" ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 861.
58 Id. at 862.
59Id.
6M Id.
61 Id. at 862-63.
"ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 863.
Id. (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973)).
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 863.
"Id.
"Id. at 863-64.
1997] 447
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prosecuted ... nevertheless remains .... Well-intentioned
prosecutors and judicial safeguards do not neutralize the vice of a
vague law." 7
3. Judge Dalzell. Judge Dalzell wrote the third and final opinion
for the panel. While Dalzell did not believe that the challenged
provisions were unconstitutionally vague, he did agree that the
overbreadth of the CDA renders it unconstitutional.6 He issued
a much more expansive opinion, however, by holding that "any
regulation of protected speech on this new medium" would be
unconstitutional.69
With regard to the issue of vagueness, Dalzell reviewed the
CDA's legislative history and the case law that Congress considered
before enacting the CDA.7° Dalzell noted that the legislative
history of the CDA indicates that Congress intended "that the term
indecency... ha[ve] the same meaning as established in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation."71 "[S]ince the definition of indecency arose
from the Supreme Court itself in Pacifica, we may fairly imply that
the Court did not believe its own interpretation to invite 'arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement' or 'abut upon sensitive areas of
basic First Amendment freedoms.' "72 In light of this jurispru-
dence and legislative history, Dalzell concluded that the ACLU's
challenge on vagueness grounds would not likely succeed on the
merits and therefore was not deserving of injunctive relief.73
Dalzell's analysis of the reach of the challenged provisions led
him to a much broader holding than Judge Buckwalter. While
Buckwalter left open the possibility of future legislation regulating
indecency on the Internet, Dalzell decided that any regulation of
'
7 Id. at 864 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373-74 (1964)).
'
8 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 867.
9 Id.
'
0 Id. at 869 n.7.
7 Id. at 869. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The FCC codified the
meaning of "indecent programming" relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Pacifica, as
.programming that describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently
offensive manner as measured by contemporary community standards for the cable medium."
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 868 (quoting Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 112
(D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1996) (citing what is now 47 C.F.R. §
76.701(g))).
"ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 869 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09
(1972)).
"
3ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 869.
448 [Vol. 4:437
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protected speech in cyberspace would be an unconstitutional
violation of the First Amendment.
Dalzell began by recognizing that the Internet is an entirely new
medium of mass communication.7 4 He further noted that "the
analysis of a particular medium of mass communication must focus
on the underlying technology that brings the information to the
user.""5 Although the Internet developed without any content-
based considerations, Dalzell recognized that "[a]fter the CDA...
the content of a user's speech will determine the extent of partici-
pation in the new medium."76 Dalzell concluded that "[i]f a
speaker's content is even arguably indecent in some communities"
the speaker will either censor her speech so that it is acceptable in
all communities or "decline to enter the medium at all."77 A
speaker would be forced into such a decision because, unlike with
other forms of media, there is no technologically feasible way for
the speaker to limit the dissemination of her speech over the
Internet.78
It was thus clear to Dalzell that the CDA would "without doubt,
undermine the substantive, speech-enhancing benefits that have
flowed from the Internet."7' The CDA would "diminish the
worldwide dialogue that is the strength and signal achievement of
the medium."' Dalzell's examination of the special characteristics
of communication over the Internet led him to conclude that the
Internet is worthy of the broadest possible protection from govern-
ment-imposed, content-based regulation."1 While he recognized
that the government has a compelling interest in shielding minors
from pornographic material, Dalzell cautioned that regulations that
restrict certain views from society for the benefit of children risk
ruining the very society that the children will eventually inherit.
8 2
74 Id. at 872.
'5 Id. at 876.
76 Id. at 877.
77 Id. at 877-78.
7
" ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 878.
7 Id.
soId. at 879.
sB Id. at 881.
82 Id. at 882.
1997] 449
13
McGee: Burning the Village to Roast the Pig: Congressional Attempt to Re
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1997
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
III. APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
One of the most significant aspects ofACLU v. Reno is the court's
conclusion that the CDA's attempt to regulate indecent speech on
the Internet must be subject to a strict scrutiny standard of review.
"Nearly fifty years ago, Justice Jackson recognized that '[tihe
moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the
sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures,
values, abuses and dangers. Each ... is a law unto itself.' "'
This essentially means that different forms of communication may
receive different levels of First Amendment protection. The level
of First Amendment protection afforded to a particular type of
speech will determine how closely courts will scrutinize attempts
to regulate that speech.
A short history of free speech regulation provides insight as to
the proper level of scrutiny that should be applied to regulation of
indecent speech on the Internet. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,"
the Supreme Court held that a broadcast that is indecent, but not
obscene, could be regulated by the government.' The broadcast
at issue was a radio broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words"
monologue. 6 The Court stated that Carlin's "filthy words" were
of "such slight social value ... that any benefit.., derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the societal interest in order and
morality." 7 The Court distinguished print media, where any
attempt to regulate indecent speech would be unconstitutional,
from broadcasting because the broadcast media has "a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans" and "is uniquely
accessible to children, even those too young to read."' The key to
the Pacifica decision was the Court's characterization of a radio
broadcast as a type of "intruder" that not only confronts citizens in
public but also in the privacy of their own homes.8 9 The Court
' ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 873 (E.D. Pa.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
(quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
" 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
5Id. at 727.
MId. at 729-30.
81 Id. at 746 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
"Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
8Id. at 748.
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concluded that an individual's right to be left alone in the privacy
of her own home clearly outweighed an "intruder's" First Amend-
ment rights."° Employing a less than strict scrutiny standard of
review, the Court upheld the FCC's regulation of broadcast
indecency.
The reach of the Pacifca opinion has been eroded by subsequent
opinions including Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products.91 In Bolger,
the Supreme Court held that a federal law prohibiting the unsolic-
ited mailing of contraceptive advertisements was an unconstitution-
al restriction on commercial speech.92 Declining to extend the
rationale of Pacifica to Bolger, the Court reasoned that the receipt
of mail is less of an intrusion into the home than broadcasting.
93
Parents generally exercise substantial control over the disposition
of mail delivered to their home. Conversely, broadcasting is readily
accessible to children, and because listeners are constantly tuning
in and out, prior warnings cannot completely shield the audience
from undesired program content. A measure of control over the
mail that comes into the household affords parents a better
opportunity to shield their children from material that they do not
want them to view. As the Court stated, "[t]he level of discourse
reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would
be suitable for a sandbox."'
In Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC,95 the Supreme Court
again limited the Pacifica decision by holding that a statutory
prohibition on indecent as well as obscene "dial-a-porn" telephone
messages was unconstitutional." Rejecting the government's
argument that Pacifica was controlling, the Court emphasized that
Pacifica did not mandate a total ban on indecent communica-
tions.9 7 The Court recognized that there is a distinct difference
between a broadcast that intrudes in the privacy of one's home and
a medium that requires the listener to take active steps to receive
go Id.
9' 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
92 Id.
9Id. at 74.
94 Id.
"492 U.S. 115 (1989).
9 Id.
91 Id. at 127.
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the communication." Knowingly placing a telephone call to listen
to a sexually-oriented pre-recorded telephone message is manifestly
different from turning on a radio and being surprised by an
indecent program.
Finally, in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC," the Supreme
Court refused to extend Pacifica's less rigorous standard of scrutiny
for broadcast indecency to cable television." At first glance, it
would appear that Pacifica's rationale should have applied to
Turner because of the similarities between cable television and
radio broadcasting. With both mediums, a passive viewer or
listener receives broadcast information.1"1 However, "the analysis
of a particular medium of mass communication must focus on the
underlying technology that brings the information to the user"
rather than on the end product that the viewer receives.10 2
In examining the underlying technology that brings cable
television and radio broadcasts to a user, it is clear that cable
television is less of an intruder into the household than broadcast
radio. To receive broadcast radio in the home, a homeowner merely
needs to possess a functional receiver. On the other hand, mere
possession of a television is not enough to bring cable television
into the household. A homeowner must pay for the service of
receiving cable television. Additionally, a homeowner may choose
what cable channels are available for viewing on her television and
therefore has more control over what is broadcast into her home.
As cable television is a much less intrusive presence in the
household, the decision not to extend the Pacifica rationale to
Turner was sound.
Following the reasoning of the aforementioned Supreme Court
decisions, it is clear that the CDA's attempt to regulate indecent
speech on the Internet should be subject to strict scrutiny. The
Internet is a unique medium distinct from existing modes of
communication. It developed as a giant network interconnecting
small groups of networks with no centralized control point for
Id. at 127-28.
114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
'
00 Id. at 2457.
"ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 876.
102 Id.
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communications."°  This unregulated connection of networks
allows tens of millions of people worldwide to share diverse
information through different methods of communication like e-
mail, "chat rooms," and distributed message databases at very low
cost.'04 The system's "open, distributed, decentralized nature
stands in sharp contrast to most information systems that have
come before it." 5 The Internet is thus "a unique and wholly new
medium of worldwide human communication" separate from
existing technology."°
Reception of communications over the Internet requires active
participation by the user, unlike reception of broadcasting, which
requires only a passive receiver. As the court stated in its findings
of fact, "it takes several steps to enter cyberspace."'0 7 At the very
least, a user must have access to a computer that can reach the
Internet. Further, the user must have the ability to use the
computer to "surf' the Internet for information."l~ This requires
the user to have a certain amount of knowledge, but more impor-
tantly requires that the user actively take steps to obtain the
desired information. This active participation by the Internet user
stands in stark contrast to an individual passively listening to a
broadcast. Individuals have more control over what they are
exposed to on the Internet than what they hear broadcast over the
radio. "Communications over the Internet do not 'invade' an
individual's home or appear on one's computer screen unbid-
den."'0
As the world's largest form of mass communication, the Internet
is more like a giant town meeting than a method of broadcasting.
Because of the distinct differences between broadcast speech and
speech on the Internet, the reasoning in Pacifica that led to
regulation of broadcast indecency should not be extended to ACLU
v. Reno. To the extent that the Court in Pacifica evaluated the
FCC's regulation of broadcast indecency under a lesser standard of
103 Id. at 830-32.
'
04 1d. at 831-34.
10 Id. at 838.
"ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 844.
107 l1
106 lId.
109 Id.
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review, there is no reason to employ a lower standard in ACLU v.
Reno. Strict scrutiny is therefore the appropriate standard for
judicial review of the CDA. "As the most participatory form of
mass speech yet developed, the Internet deserves the highest
protection from governmental intrusion." 1.
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Society clearly has an interest in generally maintaining civilized
discourse and in protecting children from some of the on-line
material that motivated Congress to enact the CDA. On the other
hand, the benefits of preserving the right to free speech cannot be
disputed. Whatever compelling interests the Government has in
attempting to regulate indecent speech, the CDA does not pass
constitutional muster. The CDA is unconstitutional because it is
overly broad, vague and not narrowly tailored.
A. THE REACH OF THE CDA
The overbreadth doctrine serves to invalidate legislation that
sweeps within its ambit of allowable proscriptions other constitu-
tionally protected rights of free speech, press or assembly."' A
law sweeps too broadly when a protected activity is a substantial
part of the law's target, and there is no way to sever the law's
constitutional applications from its unconstitutional applica-
tions. 11
2
The CDA fails both parts of the overbreadth test. First, since the
aim of the CDA is to regulate "indecent" speech on the Internet, a
protected activity, free speech, is a substantial part of the law's
target. Second, it is impossible to separate the law's constitutional
applications from its unconstitutional applications. Clearly, an
individual who knowingly transmits pornographic material to a
child could be prosecuted under the CDA without violating the
Constitution. What about a museum curator who posts a photo of
a nude statue on a museum's Web page so that individuals who
1
,
0 Id. at 883.
... Thornill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
112 Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987).
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cannot afford to travel to the museum in person can go on a virtual
tour? What about a librarian who, in response to an e-mail
request, transmits to a minor portions of John Steinbeck's Of Mice
and Men, J.D. Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye, or Mark Twain's
The Adventures of Tom Sawyer, books that individuals have
attempted to ban in schools and public libraries across the United
States. Because the CDA broadly proscribes indecency, the curator
or the librarian could arguably be prosecuted as easily as the
sexual predator. Depending on the proclivities of an individual
prosecutor, "indecency" could include a broad range of material that
individuals are constitutionally entitled to access. Contemporary
literature, films, plays, art and photographs showing or describing
nude bodies or sexual activity could be considered indecent in some
communities. Similarly, free information on rape, pregnancy,
sexually transmitted diseases or prophylactics could be viewed as
indecent and banned from the Internet. In seeking to control smut
on the Internet Congress has proscribed too much. The CDA
sweeps too broadly because it restricts adults from material that
they are constitutionally entitled to access.
The Government argued that the challenged provisions are not
broad because the Department of Justice will "limit the CDA's
application in a reasonable fashion that would avoid prosecution for
placing on the Internet works of serious literary or artistic
merit."'13 This would place a great deal of trust in prosecutors
across the country who come from different backgrounds and who
likely have very different views about what is "indecent." "[T]he
First Amendment should not be interpreted to require us to entrust
the protection it affords to the judgment of prosecutors." 14
Failing both parts of the overbreadth test, it is clear that the
challenged provisions sweep more broadly than necessary and
unconstitutionally infringe upon rights protected by the First
Amendment.
B. THE CDA IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS
A law is void for vagueness when reasonable people must
necessarily guess as to the meaning of the law or its applica-
13 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 857 (E.D. Pa.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
114 Id.
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tion." Laws that are void for vagueness are unconstitutional
because they are so obscure that a reasonable person cannot
determine from a reading of the statute what the law purports to
command or prohibit.116 Vague laws not only fail to provide fair
notice or warning to the public about what the law allows or
forbids, they also fail to provide prosecutors and judges with
administrable standards, thus creating the potential for arbitrary
enforcement." 7 Criminal statutes like the CDA should especially
be scrutinized for clarity because "In]o one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes.""' This is especially true of laws "having a potentially
inhibiting effect on speech....1 9
The indecency provision is void for vagueness because the CDA
fails to define the term "indecent." As previously noted, the
Government's position was that "indecent" was intended to have
the same meaning as "patently offensive," which was defined in the
CDA. The Government's attempt to clarify the meaning of
"indecent" in section 223(a) by linking it to the definition of
"patently offensive" in section 223(d) fails in light of the rule of
statutory construction. This rule states that "[wihere Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion
or exclusion." 2 ° Since Congress declined to insert language
which would give "indecent" the same definition as "patently
offensive," it can be presumed that Congress intended for the words
to have different meanings. Further, section 223(a) pertains to
"telecommunications devices" while section 223(d) applies to
"interactive computer services."' 2 ' The fact that these sections
11 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
116 Id.
117 Id.
"" Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)).
119 Hynes, 425 U.S. at 620 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959)).
" ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 850 (E.D. Pa.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996)
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong
Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))).12 1ACLU, 929 F. Supp at 861 n.5.
[Vol. 4:437
20
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol4/iss2/8
ACLU V. RENO
apply to different technologies adds further weight to the view that
"indecent" and "patently offensive" are not to be given the same
meaning.
2 2
Although Congress failed to mirror section 223(d)'s language in
section 223(a), the legislative history of the CDA does suggest an
intention to give "indecency" the same definition as "patently
offensive." 22 Even if section 223(a) was amended to mirror the
definition of patently offensive from section 223(d), this would not
completely cure the vagueness problem because the CDA fails to set
forth the relevant community standard for determining what
amounts to "patently offensive" or "indecent" speech on this new
and unique medium. If the CDA is meant to set forth a uniform
national standard of indecency on the Internet, it is unlikely that
such a standard could be established since "our nation is simply too
big and too diverse .. . to reasonably expect that such [a] stan-
dard[] could be articulated for all 50 states in a single formula-
tion.... ,,24 A uniform national standard could reflect the toler-
ance of an urban community. However, this would allow individu-
als from New York City to communicate over the Internet with
individuals from a rural community using speech that individuals
from the rural community might consider indecent. The urban
residents would be free from prosecution so long as they complied
with New York City standards of indecency. Congress clearly did
not intend for this to be the result. Conversely, a single national
standard could reflect the standards of the more conservative
communities in the United States. However, this would mean that
individuals communicating with each other in New York City could
be prosecuted for speech that neither regarded as indecent.
If the CDA is meant to rely on local community standards to
define indecent speech, a speaker would have no way of knowing
which local community to look to for the proper standard. Informa-
tion on the Internet can be disseminated widely without the
122 Id.
'
23 Id. at 861. The legislative history of the CDA indicates that the drafters intended the
term "indecency" to have the same definition as that established in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, and that § 223(d) codified the definition of"indecency" from Pacifica. Id. Thus
if "indecency" in § 223(a) is to have the same meaning as that established in Pacifica, it
would also have the same definition as "patently offensive".
124 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973).
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content provider knowing who will access their information. A Web
page created in a particular community can be visited by users
from anywhere in the country, and the content provider has no way
to determine the geographic origin of those users. In order to
insulate themselves from prosecution under the CDA, all Internet
speakers would have to conform their speech to the standards of
the least tolerant community in the United States. This chilling
effect on speech would clearly be unconstitutional. Any attempt to
formulate an administrable standard by which to judge indecent
speech on the Internet will have to take into account the unique
pervasiveness of this new medium. For now, Congress's failure to
articulate the proper standard for indecent speech on the Internet
renders the CDA void for vagueness.
C. THE CDA IS NOT NARROWLY TAILORED
The CDA is at heart a government imposed restriction on free
speech. As previously noted, the CDA's attempt to regulate
indecent speech should be subject to strict scrutiny. Under a strict
scrutiny analysis, the CDA "will only be upheld if it is justified by
a compelling government interest and if it is narrowly tailored to
effectuate that interest."
125
Even though the Government's interest in shielding minors from
some on-line material is compelling, the CDA is unconstitutional
because it is not narrowly tailored to effectuate the Government's
asserted interest. The Government relies on the defenses enumer-
ated in section 223(e) for its argument that the CDA is narrowly
tailored.126 However, a review of the statutory defenses makes it
clear that this legislation fails a strict scrutiny analysis because the
defenses fail adequately to narrow the CDA's scope.
Section 223(e)(5)(B) provides a defense for a user who has
restricted access to his communication through use of a verified
credit card or an adult verification service. 127 These defenses do
not effectively restrict the CDA, however, since they are not
" ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 851 (E.D. Pa.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996)
(citing Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
'ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855.
'" See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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"technologically or economically feasible for most providers."128
Credit card verification is not available for Web sites that offer free
access, since credit card companies will not verify a card number
unless there is a commercial transaction. 29 Even if credit card
companies did offer verification services for free Web sites, the
charges incurred by the Web site for the service would discourage
many content providers from establishing Web sites. 30 Similarly,
requiring content providers to use age verification technology could
drive many speakers from the marketplace. 3' "To require non-
commercial speakers to begin to charge for their speech in order to
verify age would violate the mission of many ... to provide free
information."3 2  Finally, the Government has provided no
evidence that credit card or adult verification services could ensure
that the individual providing a credit card number or adult user
password is in fact over eighteen.'33
Additionally, section 223(e)(5)(A) offers a defense to a user who
has used good faith efforts to restrict access by minors to his
communications. 134  This also fails to narrow the scope of the
CDA because there is no technology currently available that
enables content providers to restrict minors' access to their
communications. 3 Individuals who communicate with other
speakers in "chat rooms" have no way of knowing whether all
participants are adults. 3  Further, it is impossible for speakers
in "chat rooms" and other Internet media to segregate their
conversations such that certain speech would be unavailable to
minors. 131 "[Als the government concedes, for the vast majority
of applications and services available on the Internet, a user has no
way of communicating... with certainty that the content will not
"~131reach a person under eighteen....
'MACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 856.
' Brief ofAppellees at 14, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.), cert. granted, 117
S. Ct. 554 (1996) (No. 96-511).
'
3
0 Id. at 15.
131 Id. at 29.
132 Id. at 28.
'
36ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 847.
13 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
135ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 856.
1 Brief of Appellees at 14, ACLU (No. 96-511).
137 Id.
'
38 Id. at 13 (quoting Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
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The Government argued that blocking technology will soon be
available that will allow individuals to control access to their
communications, but there are "few arguments less likely to
persuade a court to uphold a criminal statute than one that
depends on future technology to cabin the reach of the statute
within constitutional bounds."139 Additionally, it is hard to see
how a statute that fails to define a broad and vague term like
"indecent" could be viewed as narrowly tailored. It is thus clear
that the CDA is not narrowly tailored to effectuate the purposes of
the statute.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING ANALYSIS
The benefit gained from regulating indecent speech should
outweigh the negative consequences of restricting this constitution-
ally protected right.4 ° Upon weighing the benefits gained from
the CDA against the chilling effect on free speech, it is apparent
that the negative consequences of such regulation clearly outweigh
any benefits.
Society certainly has an interest in generally maintaining
civilized discourse and shielding children from potentially offensive
material. However, society can capture any benefits from regulat-
ing indecent speech, without incurring the restrictions of the CDA,
through substantially more effective and less restrictive methods
that are currently available. First, legal safeguards already in
existence prohibit much of the material that Congress was
concerned about when it enacted the CDA from being distributed
on the Internet. A decision that the CDA is unconstitutional does
not mean that children will now be bombarded by obscene porno-
graphic material over the Internet. Even without the CDA, minors
still have protection from being exposed to unsuitable material on
the Internet.' Judge Sloviter stated for example that "[v]igorous
enforcement of current obscenity and child pornography laws
should suffice to address the problem the government identified in
'
38ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 857.
'o4 Id. at 851 (citing Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976)).
141 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 856 (E.D. Pa.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
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court and which concerned Congress." 142  Further, before Con-
gress enacted the CDA, the Justice Department expressed its view
that the legislation was unnecessary since the Justice Department
would continue to prosecute child pornography and on-line
obscenity using currently existing laws." Judge Dalzell agreed
that the ACLU v. Reno holding "does not deprive the Government
of all means of protecting children from the dangers of Internet
communication." 44  Children can still be protected through
continued enforcement of existing obscenity and child pornography
laws.' 45
Additionally, the availability of technology that allows parents to
restrict minors' access to on-line material offers further protection
to children. The court identified a variety of currently available
user-based features that enable parents to restrict access to
unwanted on-line material.1 46  The court first examined user-
based software such as Cyber Patrol and SurfWatch, which actually
offer more comprehensive protection for children from on-line
material. 147 Unlike the CDA, the software programs identified by
the court are able to block unwanted material originating from
outside the United States.14 Almost one-half of the information
available on the Internet originates from foreign sites. 4 Despite
the CDA, minors could continue to access any indecent material
posted outside the United States as foreign residents have little
incentive to comply with the mandates of the CDA. Because
these software programs are able to restrict minors' access to
foreign as well as domestic on-line material, they serve as more
effective screening devices than the CDA.
The court next reviewed parental control technology offered free
of charge to subscribers of on-line services such as AOL, Compu-
Serve and Prodigy."1 AOL offers a "Kids Only" parental control
142 ld. at 856-57.
143 d. at 857.
'"l. at 883.
*"5 d.
'
4 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 83842.
147 Id. at 839.
14 Brief of Appellees at 18, ACLU (No. 96-511).
14 Id. at 34.
'Nm Id. at 17.
1 1ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842.
1997] 461
25
McGee: Burning the Village to Roast the Pig: Congressional Attempt to Re
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1997
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
feature, while CompuServe and Prodigy offer subscribers the ability
to block access to "chat rooms" or other specific media within their
networks.152 "The market for this type of software is growing,
and there is increasing competition among software providers to
provide [such] products."153 In light of the technological protect-
ions offered by on-line services and the legal safeguards already in
existence, it is clear that the CDA's regulation of indecency is
unnecessary.
While the benefits of legislatively regulating indecent speech are
small given the existence of parental control technology and
existing obscenity and pornography laws, the negative consequenc-
es of restricting speech on the Internet through the CDA are
enormous. If the Court was to uphold the indecency and patently
offensive provisions of the CDA, the Internet as we know it would
be forever changed. The strength of the Internet lies in its
diversity of content due to a large number of participants from a
variety of backgrounds with easy access to the Internet. Censor-
ship laws like the CDA strike at the very heart of the Internet, its
diversity. "Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the
Government seeks.., to suppress unpopular ideas or information
.... rais[ing] the specter that the Government may effectively
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."'"
By upholding the challenged provisions as constitutional, the
judiciary would, in effect, force speakers fearing prosecution to
restrict the content they provide on the Internet to that which is
acceptable for a child. This deprives adults of materials that they
have a constitutional right to access. The chilling effect on the
exercise of free speech is obvious. The number of speakers on the
Internet would decrease as individuals who feared criminal
sanctions would be more reluctant to post materials on the
Internet. A decrease in the number of people accessing the
Internet would invariably cause the diversity of material to decline,
thus eroding the Internet's usefulness as the most accessible and
valuable source of world wide information.
1 52Id.
'
53 Id. at 839.
Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2458 (1994) (quoting Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In determining that the challenged provisions of the CDA are
facially unconstitutional, the court has left the CDA virtually
lifeless. "There's nothing really operative left of the CDA. It still
has arms and legs; it just doesn't have a heart."1  As disruptive
as the challenged provisions -would have been to communications
over the Internet, the ACLU v. Reno holding was a victory for
supporters of the open, decentralized and diverse nature of the
Internet and the World Wide Web. The high level of scrutiny that
regulation of "indecency" on the Internet will receive leaves one
with the conclusion that no such legislation will pass constitutional
muster.
Rather than assisting in the development of technology that
would allow families, schools and libraries to shield children from
offensive material, Congress chose to place on speakers the onus of
determining what material might possibly be considered indecent.
In censoring the speaker, rather than seeking to help restrict the
listener's access to the speaker, Congress focused on the wrong end
of the communication. Those responsible for children have the
primary obligation to shield them from exposure to offensive on-line
material. Indecent and patently offensive books, magazines and
movies abound, but society has chosen to restrict children's access
to such materials by creating adult book stores or adult sections in
book stores that are off limits to minors. Similarly, society requires
children to reach a certain age before they can view "R" rated
movies without an adult. With these media, legislators have not
sought to censor the speaker. Rather, minors' access to such
speakers is restricted. Speakers on the Internet should be afforded
the same level of freedom. The computer industry will continue to
invent new ways to empower parents to control Internet content
from the user end. Rather than trying to establish uniform
standards of what is "indecent," Congress should focus on assisting
in the development of technology that allows parents to choose
what they and their children are able to access.
Stephanie Stone, Judicial Panel Enjoins Enforcement of Communication. Decency Act
Provisions, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, June 13, 1996, available in 1996 WL 316862 (quoting
Marshall Dyer, an Oklahoma attorney who speaks and writes on cyberlaw issues).
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Allowing unfettered free speech on the Internet promotes
discourse in the global marketplace of ideas. The freedom to think
and speak as one will is indispensable to the discovery and spread
of truth and knowledge. The ACLU v. Reno decision is a step in
the right direction to ensure that the Internet continues to serve as
the world's largest form of mass communication. "Any content-
based regulation of the Internet, no matter how benign the purpose,
could burn the global village to roast the pig."1"
JAMES M. MCGEE
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882 (E.D. Pa.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
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